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Profits and Patriotism: Nicholas Weston, Old English Merchants, and Ireland’s Nine 
Years’ War, 1594-1603 
 
 
 
I have advertised your Lordships of the stubborn and corrupt dealing of the magistrates 
and inhabitants in corporate towns, and how that, by their traitorly issuing of their 
commodities into the country, the rebellion hath been most nourished.  For partly out of 
malice to the State for religion’s cause, but especially for their own lucre … they desire 
nothing more than a continual war, enriching themselves more in one of those years than 
in seven others.1 
         
George Carew, 
1600 
 
 
Ireland’s Nine Years’ War (1594-1603) is all too often represented as a conflict 
between the forces of Catholic Ireland and those of the Protestant English crown.  Yet 
these lines of demarcation were anything but clear to those living at the time and the 
existence of the Old English descendants of Ireland’s twelfth-century Anglo-Norman 
conquerors complicated that narrative.2  Irish-born and predominantly Catholic, the 
Old English community was firmly attached to an English cultural and political 
identity.  Having preserved the English crown’s foothold in Ireland for centuries, the 
sixteenth century witnessed their gradual, yet unmistakable, demotion from positions 
of trust and authority in favour of English Protestant appointees sent directly from 
England.  Although some had chosen to conform to the new State Church, the 
majority of Old English individuals struggled to reconcile their Catholicism, Irish 
birth, and increasing political alienation with their loyalty to a distant English 
Protestant ruler.  By the 1570s and 80s, escalating tensions had resulted in sporadic 
episodes of protest and violence, but these demonstrations failed to gain unanimous 
consent across the wider Old English community.  Coinciding with an emerging 
‘Faith and Fatherland’ ideology, the tumultuous last decade of the sixteenth century 
would test Old English loyalties like never before.  But, while notions of loyalty to a 
native land or a distant queen may have motivated some, economic and political 
ambitions were just as important in dictating the actions of Old Englishmen.    
                                                
1 Cal. S. P. Ire., 1600-1601, 65. G. Carew to Privy Council, 16 December 1600, The National Archives 
(TNA): Public Records Office (PRO), State Papers (SP) 63/207(6)/75.  
2 The term ‘Gaelic Irish’ is used here to identify the indigenous inhabitants of Ireland.  I employ the 
term ‘Old English’ to refer to the descendants of the twelfth-century Anglo Norman conquerors and 
settlers, as well as the various generations of English colonists who arrived in Ireland prior to the mid-
sixteenth century.  Though there are only a few instances of the term ‘Old English’ being employed in 
contemporary records, it is used here to identify a population which had not yet agreed on specific 
nomenclature. 
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Hugh O’Neill, the Irish Catholic Confederacy’s energetic leader, recognised 
that he would need the support of the Old English population if he was ever to 
achieve the overthrow of English authority in Ireland.  Without minimal assistance 
from the Pale and southern towns, the Confederates would lack the artillery and 
military supply system necessary for waging a full-scale war.  With this in mind, an 
inspiring Confederate ‘Faith and Fatherland’ propaganda campaign was launched 
which specifically targeted the socio-political interests of the Old English community.  
This was propped up with promises of lands and titles to disenfranchised members of 
Old English society.3  But, in spite of crown administrators’ fears of a possible 
alliance between Ireland’s two dominant communities, convincing the Old English to 
join the ‘cause’ was not such an easy task.4  Existing evidence for this war period 
strongly suggests that the majority of Old Englishmen, especially those within the 
Pale and urban centres, chose to support the crown through military service, 
intelligence and advice, victuals, and financial aid, all of which contributed to the 
eventual English victory.5  There were, of course, many exceptions, like the notorious 
and revered rebel leader Captain Richard Tyrrell, the Jesuit propagandist James 
Archer, and junior branches of many important families, including the Butlers and 
Fitzgeralds.6  More problematic was that a significant number of Old Englishmen 
managed to remain ambiguously neutral for much of the war, especially those 
amongst the mercantile classes of the Pale and English towns.  As George Carew’s 
statement at the beginning of this essay maintains, the rebellion did indeed receive 
support and nourishment from sections of Ireland’s Old English community.  Yet, the 
fact that none of Ireland’s major urban centres fell to the Confederates during this war 
is indicative of the Old English population’s continuing adherence to the English 
                                                
3 Lord Deputy to Privy Council, 26 January 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/186/22.  O’Neill planned to re-
establish a member of the Eustace family as Viscount Baltinglass.  Lt. R. Greame to Lord Deputy, 8 
August1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/192/7(IX); Russell to Burghley, 25 September 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 
63/193/32; Russell to Privy Council, 14 October 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/194/15; Russell to R. Cecil, 
9 November 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/195/9; Fenton to Burghley, 21 March 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 
63/202(1)/87; N. Dawtrey to R. Cecil, 6 June 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 62/202(2)/57.  
4 See H. Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill and the Nine Years’ War in Tudor Ireland,’ Historical Journal 36:1 
(1993), 21-37; Morgan, ‘Faith and Fatherland or Queen and Country? An Unpublished Exchange 
Between O’Neill and the State at the Height of the Nine Years’ War,’ Dúiche Néill, 9 (1994), 1-49. 
5 This is addressed in detail in R. Canning, ‘War, Identity, and the Pale: The Old English and the 1590s 
Crisis in Ireland’ (Ph.D. dissertation, University College Cork, 2012). 
6 See, for example, K. Nicholls, ‘Richard Tyrrell, soldier extraordinary,’ in Morgan (ed), The Battle of 
Kinsale (Bray, 2004), pp. 161-178; E. Hogan, Distinguished Irishmen of the Sixteenth Century 
(London, 1894); T. J. Morrissey, James Archer of Kilkenny, an Elizabethan Jesuit (Dublin, 1979); J. 
Corboy, ‘Father James Archer, S.J., 1550-1625(?),’ Studies, 33 (1944), 99-107. 
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crown.  Thus, the discrepancy between condemnations made by crown officials and 
the actual reactions of Old English individuals warrants deeper investigation.   
Although members of Ireland’s Old English population did not all share the 
same cultural values and political aspirations, it is possible to identify general trends 
affecting the community as well as more specific tendencies and attitudes amongst 
certain segments of the population.  Colm Lennon’s prosopography of the Dublin 
patricians, as well as his biographies of Richard Stanihurst and Richard Creagh, 
demonstrate that studying the lives and careers of specific individuals can offer great 
insight into the pursuits and concerns of a wider community.7  In doing so, certain 
limitations must be acknowledged.  The evidence available for such studies deals 
almost exclusively with the higher-ranking members of society, a minority composed 
of government officials, nobility, distinguished clergy and, to a lesser extent, large 
landowners, prosperous merchants, and civic officials.  Nevertheless, surviving 
material can be used to draw attention to issues affecting the broader community and, 
through the examination of prominent individuals, it is possible to discern certain 
factors which may have motivated men of lesser status to act as they did.  This essay 
aims to do just that by comparing State Paper testimonies of large-scale treasonous 
trading practices by Old English merchants with the specific loyalty and economic 
success of one of their representatives, Nicholas Weston.  It is acknowledged that 
Weston was an outstanding member of his community, yet his exceptional success 
draws attention to differing attitudes and experiences within this group.  Although 
several historians have acknowledged the role played by merchants in fuelling the war 
through the munitions trade, it has thus far been a neglected area in Irish historical 
scholarship.8  Deeper investigation is warranted because many English administrators 
placed a large portion of blame for the rebellion’s survival on the trading activities of 
Old English merchants and townsmen.  In fact, according to English servitor Thomas 
Stafford, it was the Old English townsmen who were the ‘principall ayders, abettors, 
and upholders of this unnatural Rebellion, which proceeded partly out of malice to the 
                                                
7 C. Lennon, The Lords of Dublin in the Age of Reformation (Blackrock, 1989); Lennon, Richard 
Stanihurst the Dubliner, 1547-1618 (Blackrock, 1981); Lennon, Archbishop Richard Creagh of 
Armagh, 1523-1586: An Irish Prisoner of Conscience of the Tudor Era (Dublin, 2000). 
8 Both Hiram Morgan and John McGurk have acknowledged the importance of Old English merchants 
and townsmen in supplying the rebels, noting that this is an area that warrants greater research.  
Morgan, Tyrone’s Rebellion; J. McGurk, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: The 1590s Crisis 
(Manchester, 1997). 
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State for matters of Religion, but principally for their owne benefit.’9  This may have 
been true, but the existence of Nicholas Weston indicates that not all Irish merchants 
could be tarred with the same brush, and an examination of these two contradictory 
roles might offer a constructive addition to debates about the complicated nature of 
Old English loyalties in late Elizabethan Ireland.   
 
• • • 
 
Nicholas Weston, a Dublin alderman and prosperous merchant, presents an 
interesting subject for an examination of Old English allegiances during the Nine 
Years’ War.  Firstly, unlike the nobility and country gentry typically studied, Weston 
was an untitled city-dweller.  Secondly, unlike the landed classes, Weston was not 
required to perform military services; though he did, in his capacity as a civilian 
merchant, provide equally valuable material assistance.  And thirdly, Weston differed 
from the Old English magnates and the majority of his community in another very 
fundamental way: he was a Protestant.  Exceptional in many respects, it is for these 
reasons that his name features more prominently in State Paper records than those of 
his colleagues.  Weston was nonetheless a representative of Ireland’s mercantile 
community and an examination of his experiences reveals a great many issues 
affecting and surrounding Old English merchants in Ireland at this time.  This is 
especially true when Weston’s experiences are juxtaposed against the backdrop of 
those of his colleagues because this allows for a more thorough examination of both 
the rule and the exception.    
Originally from Drogheda, Weston had become a citizen of Dublin City in 1577 
and achieved civic prominence in the decade preceding the Nine Years’ War.  In 1587 
he held an annual term as sheriff; between 1591 and 1622 he enjoyed one of the 
Corporation’s twenty-four aldermanic positions; and, in 1597-98 Weston served a 
term as Dublin City’s mayor.10  As an alderman and leading member of his 
community, Weston’s civic duties included ensuring city defences were adequate, 
watchmen were appointed to guard the walls, construction projects were managed 
efficiently, citizens performed their military obligations, and taxes and cesses were 
                                                
9 T. Stafford, Pacata Hibernia (Dublin, 1810), p. 109.  Also, see, ‘Some errors to be reformed in the 
government of Ireland,’ August 1598, University Library, Cambridge, Ms. Kk. I. 15, ff. 387-389v. 
10 Lennon, Lords of Dublin, p. 275; T. Clavin, ‘Nicholas Weston,’ Dictionary of Irish Biography, 
http://0-dib.cambridge.org.  
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paid.11  In addition to these responsibilities, Weston was regularly entrusted with the 
task of representing the suits of his fellow merchants, civic officials, and municipality 
before the Dublin administration and crown.  For example, in 1582 the Corporation 
dispatched Weston to England to seek reimbursement ‘for money corne wyne and 
other provisions deliuered for servinge the Garisons’ during recent rebellions.  
According to their petition, the crown owed the city ‘the some of 15,000l.’, for which 
Weston was appointed to receive the money and convey it to Dublin.12  This was a 
civic service he would perform several more times over the course of his career.13 
Besides being an upstanding member of the Dublin Corporation, Weston had 
also gained the favour of many crown administrators prior to the outbreak of the Nine 
Years’ War.  As early as January 1589 the State Papers expose Weston as a valuable 
source of intelligence on political and military affairs at home and abroad, even so far 
as detailing the movements of Richard Stanihurst, the exiled Dublin jack-of-all-
trades.14  Merchants were indispensable government informants because they could 
acquire intelligence on foreign enemies and conspiracies through their trading 
contacts and tavern acquaintances at international ports.  Pauline Croft has argued that 
this was especially true of Irishmen trading in Spain where authorities allowed them 
far greater privileges than their English counterparts because their Catholicism and 
hostility towards the English made them natural allies.15  As it transpired, intelligence 
gathered in this way could be more useful than that obtained through diplomatic 
channels and, taking advantage of favourable commercial circumstances, Weston and 
his agents had been particularly successful in acquiring information.  Despite severe 
trade restrictions imposed by English authorities, this success induced crown 
                                                
11 H. F. Berry (ed), ‘Minute Book of the Corporation of Dublin, Known as the “Friday Book,” 1567-
1611,’ Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, Section C, 30 (1912/1913), 477-514. 
12 J. Gaydon, Mayor of Dublin, to Burghley, 15 September 1582, TNA: PRO, SP 63/95/48; Petition of 
N. Weston, factor of Dublin Corporation, 15 September 1582, TNA: PRO, SP 63/95/50; Petition of 
Dublin merchants, 15 September 1582, TNA: PRO, SP 63/95/52; N. Ball, Mayor of Dublin, to 
Burghley, 27 September 1583, TNA: PRO, SP 63/104/101; Petition of N. Weston, 12 August 1584, 
TNA: PRO, SP 63/111/61.  Also, see, Lennon, Lords of Dublin, p. 179; T. P. Dungan, ‘John Dongan of 
Dublin, an Elizabethan Gentleman,’ Journal of the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland, 118 (1988), 
101-117; Berry, ‘Minute Book,’ 505. 
13 For example, Berry, ‘Minute Book,’ 497, 505; Petitions to the queen or the Council, 1586-1601, 
HMC Salisbury MSS, Addenda, p. 196. 
14 Advertisements by N. Weston, 1592, TNA: PRO, SP 63/164/16; Examination of John Brown, 28 
January 1589, TNA: PRO, SP 63/141/19(I); Intelligence by J. Prife, 25 April 1591, TNA: PRO, SP 
12/238/133. 
15 See, for example, P. Croft, ‘Trading with the Enemy, 1584-1604,’ The Historical Journal, 32:2 
(1989), 287-8.  Examinations taken by Edward Goeghe, Mayor of Waterford, 9 July 1601, TNA: PRO, 
SP 63/208(3)/66(I). 
 6 
administrators to grant Weston special trading liberties so he could continue shipping 
between Ireland and Spain.  And, by the time of the Nine Years’ War, the trust 
reposed in Weston as a reliable source of information was demonstrated by the fact 
that Secretary Sir Geoffrey Fenton suggested employing two of his agents as Spanish 
spies.16 
Weston’s mercantile and civic activities continued throughout the Nine Years’ 
War, but the 1590s crisis had a significant impact on his daily life and business 
operations.  Living in the very centre of Ireland’s English jurisdiction, Weston was 
relatively immune to rebel depredations – it was only if Pale border defences, in the 
charge of marcher lords like the Barons of Delvin and Dunsany, collapsed, that there 
was any serious threat of a rebel attack.  But, despite the protection provided by the 
distant frontier, this war took a massive toll on urban areas.  The inhabitants of Irish 
towns and cities not only experienced rebel conspiracies to undermine government 
stability, but they suffered the burdens of supporting large numbers of crown soldiers, 
constant material and monetary levies, price inflation, harvest crises, famine, disease, 
and fatal accidents like the 1597 gunpowder explosion.  The year 1597 serves to 
highlight the hardships endured by urban dwellers during this war.  In addition to 
hefty loans and independently supplied materials advanced by members of the 
Corporation, by June 1597 the citizens of Dublin City had petitioned the crown for the 
payment of £890 owed to them for the billeting of soldiers and a further £3,000 for 
their assistance ‘in maintaining armed companies in the field and otherwise.’17  In 
fact, the burden of supporting crown soldiers had become so onerous that in May 
1597 the twenty-four Dublin aldermen, who were statutorily exempt from billeting 
charges, resolved to waive their exemption and pay 12 pence a day towards victualing 
the soldiers so as to ‘help the other citizens... considering the present scarcity and the 
poverty of the poor neighbours.’18  But, the Corporation’s suit was made desperately 
                                                
16 Fenton to R. Cecil, 25 October 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/194/44; Fenton to Burghley, 29 October 
1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/194/53; Extract of a letter to N. Weston, 20 September 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 
63/194/53(II); Fenton to R. Cecil, 24 November 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/195/33.  Also, see, 
Advertisements by N. Weston, 1592, TNA: PRO, SP 63/164/16; N. Weston to R. Cecil, 27 March 
1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/49(I); Declaration by J. Weston, factor for N. Weston, 10 December 
1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/206/81(I); Intelligence by J. Prife, 25 April 1591, TNA: PRO, SP 12/238/133.  
Also, see, Clavin, ‘Nicholas Weston’. 
17 G. Young, Mayor of Dublin, R. Cecil, 10 Sep. 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(5)/13; HMC Salisbury 
MSS, Addenda, p. 35; Petition of Mayor and Citizens of Dublin to Burghley, June 1597, TNA: PRO, 
SP 63/199/127; Mayor and Sheriffs of Dublin to Burghley, 6 May 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/11; 
Mayor and Sheriffs of Dublin to R. Cecil, 6 May 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/12. 
18 Berry, ‘Minute Book,’ 491. 
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urgent on account of the recent gunpowder explosion which killed 126 people and 
cost an estimated £14,076 sterling in damages to buildings and infrastructure.19  Add 
to this the cost of providing men for general hostings as well as city watchmen to be 
on duty round the clock, and it is clear that the inhabitants and civic corporation were 
at pains to meet all these obligations.20  To make matters even worse, a combination 
of war and unseasonable weather had made 1597 a ‘year of “great dearth of all 
things” and ... a time of “great mortality by fever and flux”.’21  The Nine Years’ War 
had a significant impact on the daily functioning of municipalities and the lives of 
urban inhabitants and their petitions made it clear that their increasing poverty was a 
source of great discontentment and alienation.22  For these reasons, the actions and 
experiences of individuals like Nicholas Weston deserve closer attention. 
 
• • • 
 
Although a respected citizen of Dublin, a Protestant, and a loyal supporter of 
crown interests in Ireland, Nicholas Weston could not escape the fact that he was a 
member of Ireland’s Old English community.  English administrators had grave 
suspicions about the true allegiances of many Old English nobles and gentry, largely 
on account of their continued attachment to the Catholic religion and their often 
                                                
19 J. Norreys to R. Cecil, 13 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/21; Fenton to R. Cecil, 18 March 
1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/24; Russell to Privy Council, 20 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/26; 
Examinations concerning powder explosion, 16 March 1597, TNA, PRO, SP 63/198/26(IV); 
Examination of John Shelton and Alexander Palles, Dublin Sheriffs, and others, 18 March 1597, TNA: 
PRO, SP 63/198/26(V); Certificate by Mayor and Sheriffs of Dublin, 18 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 
63/198/26(VI); Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 25 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/42; 
Certificate of the number of dead by Mayor of Dublin, No date, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/42(I); Mayor 
and Sheriffs of Dublin to Burghley, 6 May 6 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/11; Mayor and Sheriffs of 
Dublin to R. Cecil, 6 May 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/12; Russell and Council to Burghley, 7 May 
1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/13; Lennon, ‘The Great Explosion in Dublin, 1597,’ Dublin Historical 
Record, 42:1 (1988), 7-20; Lennon, ‘Dublin’s Great Explosion of 1597,’ History Ireland, 3:3 (1995), 
29-34. 
20 HMC Salisbury MSS, Addenda, p. 35; Petition of Mayor and Citizens of Dublin to Burghley, June 
1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/127; Lennon, ‘Great Explosion in Dublin,’ 14-15; Berry, ‘Minute Book,’ 
490-3. 
21 Lennon, Lords of Dublin, 96; E. Hogan (ed), The Description of Ireland and the State Thereof as it is 
at This Present in Anno 1598 (Dublin, 1878), pp. 43-44; Wallop to Cecil, 3 August 1597, TNA: PRO, 
SP 63/200/75.  Also see, R. Gillespie, ‘Harvest Crisis in Early seventeenth-century Ireland,’ Irish 
Economic and Social History, 11 (1984), 5-18. 
22 The greevances of the Englishe Pale, 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(4)/60; “Collections made by Sir 
James Perrott for his Chronicle of Ireland; 1584-1619”, BL Add. Ms. 4819, f. 75v; Fenton to Burghley, 
14 August 1595, TNA: PRO, SP 63/182/35. 
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ambiguous political and cultural ties with their Gaelic Irish neighbours.23  Although 
urban residency entailed participation in a much more ‘English’ society than was the 
case in rural Ireland, the same questions of loyalty were applied to the citizens of 
cities and towns.  Indeed, open recusancy, factional politics, and familial associations 
were as much a problem within the walls of Dublin City as they were outside.24  In 
fact, these differences had actually become more pronounced over time and, as the 
author of a 1596 memorandum lamented, ‘the mayor, Aldermen, Marchants, and 
inhabitants generally are known to be notorious papists, hating the english nation and 
government, and by many speches which they let fall, do not stick to signify 
asmuch’.25  It was also frequently noted that the Jesuits and seminarians had free 
recourse to ‘raunge vp and downe, couered and harbored by the subiects both of the 
better and meaner sort of this realme, and do finde no smale releef and comfort 
freindshipp within this cytty [Dublin]’.26  The townsmen were therefore not to be 
trusted, but the questionable political and religious allegiances of urban merchants 
were of particular concern since these might lead to devious and destabilising 
business practices.   
Contesting Adam Smith’s theory of commerce driven by self-interest, Craig 
Muldrew has posited that the market in early modern England was driven largely by 
‘credit relations, trust, obligation and contracts’ rather than ‘a language which stressed 
self-interest.’27  Due to their continuing attachment to both the English crown and 
English markets, many of Ireland’s Old English merchants would have acted 
similarly.  But, by the 1590s crown-community relations had deteriorated, as had any 
sense of trust or obligation.  A combination of reasons, which included political 
alienation, economic discrimination, and the persecution of the Catholic majority, had 
caused many within Ireland’s Old English community to re-evaluate their position.  In 
the case of the merchant classes, the temptation of a profitable wartime trade must 
also have been a factor.  In fact, one group of Palesmen willingly admitted that ‘the 
                                                
23 For example, see, T. Lee, ‘The Discovery and Recovery of Ireland with the Author’s Apology,’ ed. J. 
McGurk (CELT, 2009); Maley (ed), ‘The Supplication of the blood of the English most lamentably 
murdered in Ireland, Cryeng out of the yearth for revenge (1598),’ Analecta Hibernica, 36 (1995), 3-
77; McGowan-Doyle, Book of Howth; McGowan-Doyle, ‘“Spent blood”: Christopher St Lawrence and 
Pale Loyalism,’ in The Battle of Kinsale, pp. 179-192. 
24 Lennon, Lords of Dublin; Lennon, Richard Stanihurst. 
25 Memorandum on the state of Ireland, November 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/195/52.   
26 Lord Deputy and Council to Privy Council, 25 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/42.   
27 C. Muldrew, ‘Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community Relations in Early 
Modern England,’ Social History, 18:2 (1993), 163. 
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alurements of this vnhappie tyme did offer provocacions to carry vnstaied myndes 
astray’.28  Just as the country nobility were motivated to serve the crown by the 
increased income of land grants and military salaries, and promises of titles and 
estates tempted men of lesser dignity to join the rebel confederacy, merchants like 
Nicholas Weston were aroused by the potential financial gains of war-time trade.  
Crown and country may have been at stake, but so too were profits and, taking 
advantage of lucrative wartime commerce, Old English merchants played a crucial 
role in propelling the conflict through the munitions and victual trade.  Some 
merchants chose one side over the other, but others walked a dangerous tightrope by 
openly supplying the crown while secretly arming the rebels.  It must be wondered 
then, to what degree did this reflect a sense of conflicted loyalty, religious 
polarisation, or disenchantment with English government.  Or, was this merely the 
result of efforts to exploit the current market?  
There is substantial evidence in official correspondence and the testimonies of 
examinants to indicate that Old English merchants from the Pale and towns helped 
fuel O’Neill’s rebellion through the sale of armaments and other supplies.  From an 
early date English observers expressed surprise at the sophistication and furnishing of 
O’Neill’s army.  According to Sir John Dowdall, ‘[t]hese Cannyballes haue drawen 
the greatest parte of their kearne to be musketeres, and there Galliglasse Pykes, they 
want no furniture neyther of mvsketts fowling peeces Calivers swords Graven 
morions, powder and shott great store, which these Traitores were not accustomed to 
haue in this measure.’29  Hiram Morgan has explained that during the early stages of 
the northern rebellion, and while still considered a commander of royal forces, 
O’Neill had used his position to secure munitions through local merchants.30  This 
was particularly the case in his acquisition of lead roofing, which Archbishop Peter 
Lombard conceded was accomplished through ‘the avidity of merchants intent only 
on profit.’31  In fact, according to a declaration made by one Robert Eastfeild, it was 
                                                
28 The greevances of the Englishe Pale, 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(4)/60.  
29 J. Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/187/19.  Also, see, Morgan, Tyrone’s 
Rebellion, p. 181; G. A. Hayes-McCoy, ‘The Army of Ulster, 1593-1601,’ in Irishmen in War Vol. 1 
(Dublin, 2005), p. 77. 
30 This was attested to by Fenton, who, in late 1594 ‘obtained documentary proof that O’Neill had been 
buying up and transporting large quantities of powder to Dungannon under this pretext since the 
Fermanagh campaign.’  Morgan, Tyrone’s Rebellion: The Outbreak of the Nine Years’ War in Tudor 
Ireland (Woodbridge, 1993), pp. 181-182. 
31 P. Lombard, The Irish War of Defence, 1598-1600: Extracts from the De Hibernia Insula 
Commentarius, ed. M. J. Byrne (Cork, 1930), p. 31. 
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Nicholas Weston who had been commissioned to supply O’Neill with twenty tons of 
lead, ‘but as God would, the Earl got but 6.’32  It is well documented that O’Neill 
converted this lead into bullets, but six tons of lead would not have made enough 
bullets to fight this war.33  O’Neill’s ability to keep the field and challenge crown 
forces at every turn would have required a constant supply of munitions and other 
necessities and this degree of armament could not have been achieved solely by 
hoarding munitions in the years leading up to the 1595 proclamation against him.  
Although there is plenty of documentary evidence to show that Spain sent material 
assistance to O’Neill and his Confederates, Spanish shipments of arms and treasure 
were sporadic and did not meet the demands of this conflict either.34  While it seems 
that some gunpowder had been produced locally, Ireland did not yield adequate 
resources, having ‘no Brymstone’, for the development of a suitable munitions 
industry.35  But, these limitations did not hinder O’Neill, largely because he had 
managed to secure a number of other supply sources.  In addition to what he had 
stock-piled prior to the war, received from Spain, or gained by ambushing English 
supply convoys,36 a significant proportion of O’Neill’s munitions were transported 
out of Scotland, England, and other places by Irish merchants, and surviving records 
indicate the vast majority of these were Old Englishmen from the Pale.37  For 
example, a significant proportion of the Scottish trade was conducted by John Bath, a 
Palesman who became ‘a great merchant of Strabane’, ‘close associate of the earl,’ 
                                                
32 R. Eastfeild to Burghley or R. Cecil, 20 December 1596, HMC Salisbury MSS, 1596, pp. 529-530. 
33 Dr James O’Neill has calculated that six tons of lead would have made 224,808 bullets (of 17 gauge 
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and K. Jeffery (eds), A Military History of Ireland (Cambridge, 1996); C. Falls, Elizabeth’s Irish Wars 
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35 John Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/187/19. 
36 Loftus, Carey and Irish Council to Privy Council, 15 December 1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/206/84. 
37 G. Nicolson to R. Bowes, 8 July 1595, TNA: PRO, SP 52/56/586; R. Bowes to Burghley, 6 
November 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 52/61/98; J. Auchinross to G. Nicolson, 1 August 1595, TNA: PRO, 
SP 52/56/620; R. Bowes to Burghley, 6 November 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 52/61/98(I); TNA: G. 
Nicolson to R. Cecil, 27 February 1599, PRO, SP 52/64/329; Scrope to Cecil, 21 February 1600, TNA: 
PRO, SP 59/38/1149; Advertisements sent to Henry Duke by several espials, 20 February 1595, TNA: 
PRO, SP 63/178/53(V); Extracts of a letter from Richard Weston to Fenton, 15 January 1599, TNA: 
PRO, SP 63/203/19(I); G. Carew to Privy Council, 30 August 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(4)/105; A. 
Chichester to R. Cecil, Dec. 16, 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(6)/78.  Morgan, Tyrone’s Rebellion, p. 
182; F. Moryson, An Itinerary, Vol. II (1617), 237. 
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and was rumoured to have gained a trade monopoly from the rebels.38  But Bath was 
not alone, and as Dowdall exclaimed, ‘The Erle of Tyrone hath fraighted Shippes to 
Danske for powder, and to England for Leadd, out of her Maiesties civill Townes.’39   
To the chagrin of crown officials, there were a number of enterprising 
merchants who were willing to profit from supplying the enemy.40  War, of course, 
presented certain hazards for overseas trade due to embargos, piracy, and detainment 
by foreign enemies; domestic trade was equally dangerous on account of the inherent 
perils of transporting materials through conflict zones.41  Nevertheless, war is a 
particularly profitable time for business due to elevated demands for military supplies 
and corresponding price inflation.42  In terms of food prices, a very conservative 
estimate would allow for a minimum two-fold increase during these war years, and 
correspondence from Ireland usually reported prices to be much higher.  In fact, in 
early 1597 Lord Deputy William Russell contended that prices were five times the 
normal while other accounts infer treble and quadruple rates.43  Taking advantage of 
these economic circumstances, members of Ireland’s mercantile community were 
eager to trade with whom they could and, in doing so, they played a crucial role in 
equipping and sustaining the Irish Catholic Confederacy.44  
Because Hugh O’Neill had declared himself for the Catholic cause in order to 
attract more support at home and abroad, most crown administrators readily endorsed 
the link between recusancy and rebel support.45  And, regardless of how devout they 
actually were, these merchants were indispensable to the progress of the Counter-
                                                
38 Extracts of a letter from Richard Weston to Fenton, 15 January 1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/203/19(I); 
Morgan, Tyrone’s Rebellion, 182; Moryson, An Itinerary, Part II, 237.  Advertisements sent to Sir 
Henry Duke by several espials, 20 February 1595, TNA: PRO, SP 63/178/53(V). 
39 J. Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/187/19.  For examples of Old English 
merchants engaged in illegal trade in Cork and Limerick, see, W. Lyon, Bishop of Cork and Ross, to R. 
Cecil, 15 February 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 62/207(I)/108; G. Carew to Privy Council, 18 July 1600, 
TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(4)/26. 
40 Moryson, An Itinerary, p. 298. 
41 H. Brouncker to R. Cecil, 22 January 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(I)/29.  For Weston’s problems, 
see, TNA: PRO, N. Weston to R. Cecil, 27 March 1597, SP 63/198/49(I); Privy Council Meeting, 7 
November 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 2/24/178.  McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, p. 184. 
42 See Bartlett, ‘“The academy of warre”: military affairs in Ireland, 1600 to 1800,’ The O’Donnell 
Lecture (Dublin, 2002); J. Nolan, Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World (Exeter, 1997); 
Nolan, ‘The Militarization of the Elizabethan State,’ The Journal of Military History, 58:3 (1994), 391-
420. 
43 Russell to Burghley, 24 March 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/33; ‘The greevances of the Englishe 
Pale’, 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(4)/60. 
44 J. Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/187/19; ‘The opinion and advice of 
Captain John Baynard,’ December 1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/206/116. 
45 For example, see Fynes Moryson’s account in C.L. Falkiner, Illustrations of Irish History and 
Topography, Mainly of the Seventeenth Century (London, 1904), pp. 264-67. 
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Reformation in Ireland because they provided transport for Irish students heading to 
continental colleges and return passage for zealous continentally-trained clerics.46  As 
Dowdall explained, the merchants carried ‘younge men bothe of the Iryshe and 
Englishe nation, in the company of Iesuytes’ to the Catholic colleges of Spain, Italy, 
and France, and ‘when they haue bene thorowlie corrupted, they retourne them againe 
with Letters of Commendacion, with instructions to seduce the people to 
disobedience, and Rebellion’.47  The administration had evidence of this.  For 
instance, it was the Drogheda merchant James Fleming who transported the 
rebellion’s early clerical instigators, Archbishops Magauran and O’Hely, between 
Ireland and Spain.48  Merchants like Fleming also provided the means for 
correspondence with foreign Catholic powers.  Presumably most correspondence was 
in the form of letters, but under interrogation the merchant Valentine Blake admitted 
that he was instructed to bring the rebels a verbal message of Spanish support rather 
than a written one for fear that a letter might be intercepted.49  As a result of this 
secrecy, and the loss of records over time, evidence detailing the activities of rebel 
colluders within the Irish towns is fragmentary.  It is nonetheless illuminating.   
An attachment to the Catholic faith may have been a motivating factor for some 
merchants, but it is unlikely that religion provided the chief impetus for sedition since 
there were so many other pressing concerns affecting Ireland’s Old English 
population and the merchant community during this period.  That many local 
merchants were eager to conduct business with crown officials and soldiers cannot be 
doubted and there were many like Weston who sold their wares to the crown 
administration and army.50  But, notwithstanding various petitions and supply 
                                                
46 For example, see, Advertisements sent to Sir Henry Duke by several espials, 20 February 1595, 
TNA: PRO, SP 63/178/53(V); Lord Deputy to R. Cecil, 23 May 1595, TNA: PRO, SP 63/179/90; Lord 
Deputy to Burghley, 8 November 1594, TNA: PRO, SP 63/177/5; J. Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 
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47 John Dowdall to Burghley, 9 March 1596, TNA: PRO, SP 63/187/19. 
48 Archbishop Magauran from Spain to Ireland in 1592 and Archbishop O’Hely from Ireland to Spain 
in 1593.  Declaration of Henry Taylor, 10 May 1594, TNA: PRO, SP 63/174/45(II).  Also, M. Kerney 
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49 V. Blake to C. Clifford, 12 May 1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/205/58.  
50 Mountjoy and Council to Privy Council, 12 September 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(5)/15; Note of 
ships entertained at Lough Foyle, 8 Dec. 1600, TNA: PRO, SP 63/207(6)/64; Loftus to Cecil, 7 April 
1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/198/78.  Also, see, ‘Note of 2,401l. 10s. 0d. borrowed,’ 23 December 1595, 
TNA: PRO, SP 63/185/25(II); Docket of Irish Suitors, 20 June 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/112; 
Docket of Irish Suitors, 26 June 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/199/121. 
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proposals put forward by merchants from Ireland,51 the most lucrative army supply 
contracts were secured by merchants in England, especially those in London.52  This 
preferential treatment was more than likely a product of the ineffectual supply system 
by which the Privy Council entrusted food and apparelling contracts to a select 
number of approved civilian merchants, those in London being the most convenient.53  
Nevertheless, this tendency reinforced competition between Irish and English 
mercantile groups, and it must have served to further alienate Irish merchants from 
the English establishment.54   
In addition to religious, political and economic discrimination, there were other 
more immediate considerations driving Old English merchants to arm the rebels.  
Amongst the enticements was the fact that Irish merchants had a virtual monopoly on 
trade within Ireland.55  As Bishop William Lyons explained: ‘Every creek along this 
coast hath merchants in it, trading without restraint … Where an Englishman dares 
not to go a quarter of a mile out of any town, but he shall be murdered, the Irish 
merchant passeth amongst them quietly; they will not hurt their best friends and 
maintainers.’56  Another factor was that crown soldiers were not a consistent source of 
income.  The unreliable dispensation of army pay, as well as the crown’s failure to 
honour bills and receipts, meant that soldiers were rarely able to pay for food and 
goods.  This deficit could be remedied by turning to an alternative group of 
consumers, and the fact that the enemy was willing to pay on delivery, and at higher 
rates than the crown, must have been a tempting lure.57  As Thomas Stafford 
contended, the merchants of Ireland were well known to ‘issue their Marchandise to 
the Rebells (underhand) at very excessiue rates’.58  And, considering deserting 
English soldiers were known to sell their weapons to the enemy in order to buy 
                                                
51 For example, Plot for furnishing provant apparel, 22 October 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(3)/123. 
52 For examples of Victualing contracts secured by London merchants, see British Library (BL), Add 
MS 49609 A; BL, Add MS 4757, ff. 19-21; 44-46. 
53 R.W. Stewart, “The ‘Irish road’: military supply and arms for Elizabeth’s army during the O’Neill 
Rebellion in Ireland, 1598-1601,” in M.C. Fissel (ed.), War and Government in Britain, 1598-1650.  
(Manchester, 1991).  For corruption charges made against London merchants John Jolles and William 
Cockayne, see, McGurk, Elizabethan Conquest, p. 207 
54 Fenton to R. Cecil, 11 August 1597, TNA: PRO, SP 63/200/88.   
55 Memorandum by John Bird to Privy Council, July 1599, TNA: PRO, SP 63/205/125.   
56 Cal. S. P. Ire., 1599-1600, p. 476. 
57 Stafford, Pacata Hibernia, p. 109; Moryson, Itinerary, p. 240. 
58 Ibid. 
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passage out of Ireland or just obtain cash to meet their daily needs, it is hardly 
surprising that Irish merchants took advantage of the same market.59  
Officials like Stafford insisted that the rebellion would have quickly crumbled 
without this illegal supply network.  Thus determined to undermine it, a number of 
crown officials went to great lengths to investigate how the prohibited trade with the 
enemy was conducted.  At the local level, Stafford explained that the merchants 
bought up ‘the Countrey Commodities at their owne prizes’ – that is, cheaper than the 
same could be purchased by crown commissioners – and then sold these products to 
the royal army rank and file whenever soldiers managed to obtain disposable cash.60  
When this market proved unprofitable, many merchants, often through middlemen, 
turned to a more dubious clientele because, as Fynes Moryson complained, ‘the 
Rebels will give such extreme and excessive prices, that they will never be kept from 
them.’61  This extremely lucrative trade provided merchants with great incentive to 
procure supplies wherever they could and, as William Saxey, Chief Justice of 
Munster, despaired: 
 
they with their moneys repair into England and other places, and bestow all they have, or 
can get upon credit, for swords, headpieces, muskets, powder and lead (no fit wares for 
merchants to deal in) ... the reputed subjects of the country buy of the merchants, and sell 
to the rebels after these rates, viz., they have of the rebels six beeves for a sword, six 
beeves for a headpiece, six beeves for a culiver or musket, and one beef for a pound of 
powder, and so from time to time do furnish them, and by the pretended subject the 
kingdom is put to sale.62  
 
Studying the Bristol smuggling trade, Evan Jones has demonstrated that 
merchants conducted both legal and illegal trade at the very same time, maximizing 
profits wherever possible.63  In fact, smuggled goods were carried in the very same 
vessels as cargo which had been registered with port authorities.  The same held true 
in Ireland where, like their English counterparts, merchants not only evaded custom 
duties, but also sought to profit by supplying the crown administration while secretly 
shipping goods to trade with its enemies.  As a 1600 intelligence report explained, 
                                                
59 Administrators in Ireland frequently complained about soldiers selling their own arms for these 
purposes. For example, Lords Justices Loftus and Gardener, Ormond, and Irish Council to Privy 
Council, 4 May 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(II)/26; Lord Justice Carey to R. Cecil, 3 December 1599, 
TNA: PRO, SP 63/206/65.  
60 Stafford, Pacata Hibernia, p. 109; Moryson, Itinerary, p. 240. 
61 Moryson, Itinerary, p. 240. 
62 Cal. S. P. Ire., 1599-1600, p. 181; Cal. S. P. Ire., 1599-1600, pp. 285-86. 
63 E. T. Jones,  ‘Illicit Business: Accounting for Smuggling in Mid-Sixteenth-Century Bristol,’ The 
Economic History Review, 54:1 (2001), 17-38.  Also, see, G. D. Ramsay, ‘The Smugglers’ Trade: A 
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Irish merchants’ ‘caskes are separated in the middest, the one ende whereof 
comteyneth drincke, and the other powder, and some whiles all powder and matche, 
And to make the Barrell the more to be thoughte to conteyne all beare, yt shall haue a 
Bonge on the topp thereof, the which as the Marchaunts in this deceavinge manner of 
the officers of the customes doe transporte, So do they issue the same in that manner 
into the countreys to the Rebells.’64  Due to the nature of contemporary records, it is 
impossible to ascertain the true scale of illegal trading and smuggling at this time, but 
it must have been significant since it elicited repeated calls for legislation against 
trade between ‘the merchants in the borough townes & Citties’ and suspected rebels.65  
As early as August 1595 the Dublin administration responded to reports of illegal 
trade by issuing a detailed proclamation against the transportation and sale of 
munitions by ‘suche wicked merchants and others who preferr their private vngodly 
gaine before the good of their countrie.’66  The proclamation stipulated that 
gunpowder could only be shipped by approved merchant adventurers, and only so 
much ‘as may serve to furnishe their shippinge’.  Any person who disobeyed this 
directive would forfeit his goods and ‘indure imprisonment duringe the L. Deputies 
pleasure’.  It further decreed that all individuals living in Ireland, including the 
merchants, were prohibited from accumulating and selling gunpowder and must 
surrender all that they currently possessed to the chief magistrates of their locale.  
These local officials were, in turn, instructed to collect the gunpowder and store it in 
the town hall from where it was ‘to be issued … by warrant from vs the L. Deputie … 
to the Noble men sheriffes and Iustices of peace … and to suche other person or 
persons as we shall thinke meete.’67   
This 1595 proclamation left little room for misinterpretation, but like so many 
others which followed, it failed to stem the illegal arms trade.68  In 1596, Dowdall 
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informed Burghley that the rebels continued to purchase munitions from ‘the 
merchants of euerye towne in this Kingdome.’69  A year later, Munster undertaker Sir 
Edward Fitton alerted Burghley to O’Neill’s acquisition of ‘lead for Bullett muskettes 
murryones Hed peeces sordes and dagers,’ all of which was transported out of 
England by Irish merchants, who, ‘as I learne are most obstynate papistes and 
recusants.’70  Fitton believed that immediate and severe action had to be taken against 
offending merchants and, because cross-channel trading networks were the chief 
source of the munitions trade, successful prosecution would require cooperation 
between authorities in Ireland and England.  Fitton therefore shared his knowledge 
with the mayor of Chester, Thomas Smith, as well as Sir Richard Molynex in 
Manchester, and his deputy, John Asheton, instructing them ‘to stay all vppon the 
[English] Coast that were Irishe marchantes.’71  Intelligence and information was duly 
exchanged between officials on both islands and a thorough investigation of ships was 
conducted at English ports.  Their efforts bore little fruit.  As Thomas Smith reported, 
they had ‘staid the owners & broken vpp all the dryfattes barrels & Bales or greate 
hoppe Sackes’ in Chester and Liverpool, but had ‘founde nothinge.’72   
News of this sort would not have surprised William Saxey who noted that the 
illegal trade was far too profitable for everyone involved, including informers and the 
searchers at English ports who readily accepted bribes in return for silence.73  As 
Geoffrey Elton’s work on the informant business has shown, even the highest-ranking 
ministers in England were susceptible to the profits of commercial corruption, so one 
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could hardly blame their lesser-paid subordinates.74  Meanwhile, searchers at Irish 
ports were known to take bribes for the illegal passage of crown soldiers out of 
Ireland, so it was not surprising that they did the same for the illegal importation of 
goods.75  As Justice Saxey lamented, ‘the gain is so excessive, that the merchant, 
stopping the searcher’s mouth, makes treble gain by selling to subjects; if to rebels, as 
much more.’76  The government responded by prescribing harsh punishments for 
offenders, even so far as entertaining recommendations for the death penalty,77 while 
promising hefty rewards, ‘the Moytie or half of the offenders goods forfeited,’ to 
informers if their testimony proved true.78  Over the course of the century, many 
informants had happily profited from this system of justice in England, but in the 
context of Ireland and the Nine Years’ War these incentives were of little avail.  
Volunteered information was notoriously unreliable, possibly because would-be 
informers chose to blackmail offending merchants rather than pursue a less rewarding 
course of legal proceedings.79  Besides, the Pale was a small community and 
informing on one’s colleagues did not make for easy relations; in fact, it was said that 
Nicholas Weston had earned the enmity of his colleagues for doing just that.80  
Perhaps others were not as willing to forego friendships and business relations in 
exchange for crown favour.   
In spite of administrative efforts, obtaining reliable information on transgressors 
proved extremely difficult.  John Asheton reported from Manchester that detained 
Irish and English merchants ‘will hardlie speake truthe beinge sworne I feare, ffor that 
they by such Secrett meanes make a gayne of the Yrishemen.’81  Thomas Smith had a 
similar experience in Chester when he apprehended and examined three Dublin 
merchants in June 1597, one of whom was a factor for the then acting mayor, Michael 
Chamberlain.82  He questioned them about their involvement in purchasing and 
transporting munitions from England to Ireland as well as their knowledge of other 
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Irish merchants doing the same.  The first examinant, Patrick Conley, testified that 
Alderman Robert Panting, along with his factors Thomas Long and Stephen Cashel, 
‘vseth to buy at London hedpeeces and swordes only, and transported the same over 
by way of Marchandizes.’  The second, Richard Nugent, also identified Panting, but 
added that ‘Walter Galtram & John Wafer of Dublin aforesaid Marchants doe vse to 
deale for sworde blades and hedpeeces in England and transporte the same by way of 
Marchandizes ouer to Dublin.’  Finally, Nicholas Galtram made a similar report, 
‘saving that … Walter Galtram hath not vsed to deale for any swords and hed peecs or 
other Armor aboue the some of 20tie marks by the yeare.’  He did however note that 
another merchant, John Myles, ‘delt for hedpeeces sworde blades Calivers musketts 
and fowling peeces to the value of one hundred pounds by yeare.’83  Those named 
were already suspected by the administration, so this was not particularly helpful 
information.  And, upon further questioning, all three examinants denied knowing of 
any other merchants ‘in Dundalke Droheda or of any other parte of Ireland or any 
other persons then those he hath afore named that doe vse to deale for any sorte of 
Armor or Weapons.’  Suspected of criminal trading practices themselves, the 
examinants’ reluctance to testify against others might be a potential clue to how 
widespread and lucrative the illicit trade really was.  In fact, Conley’s employer may 
have been the same Chamberlain who was caught trying to illegally export coal to 
France in 1601, and so it is probably an unlikely coincidence that his agent was 
suspected of smuggling arms for the enemy.84  In the aftermath of the 1597 
gunpowder explosion the administration acquired incriminating evidence of 
gunrunning against a number of leading Dubliners, but principally John Allen, the 
English-born crown appointed clerk of the government’s storehouse.85  It was doubted 
that he had been operating alone and thus two Dublin aldermen along with two 
prominent merchants were also questioned in relation to their connections with Allen.  
This would lend itself to the impression that illegal profits tempted people at all levels 
of Irish society, and that economic interest in this illicit trade helped bind the urban 
mercantile community in way that deterred them from betraying their colleagues.86 
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John McGurk has stated that the Nine Years’ War ‘gave rise to much disloyal 
trading in arms.’87  There is no denying that provisioning the queen’s enemies was 
treason; however, it would be difficult to argue that political allegiances had any real 
bearing on the commercial interests of Old English merchants since there is evidence 
that merchants who traded with O’Neill also traded with the crown.  For instance, 
Thomas Jones, Bishop of Meath, informed Cecil that although Walter Brady, a 
Drogheda merchant, had ‘somewhat furthered hir mats service by procuring a castle to 
be buylded att the Cavan … the greatest benefit thereof redounded to himself.  In the 
beginyng of this rebellion, vnder pretence of vittayling that castle, the rebels of that 
countie found great relief.’88  Potential profits drove trade, and it is unlikely that many 
merchants struggled with the ethical dilemma of supplying two opposing armies.89  
Only those who entirely abstained from trading with the enemy, be it O’Neill or the 
crown, can be considered to have been restrained by their allegiances.  This would 
seem to be the case with Nicholas Weston, yet he too probably recognised the 
economic benefits of his particular brand of patriotism. 
 
• • • 
 
Like the rest of the mercantile community, Nicholas Weston sought to profit 
from the Nine Years’ War, but he would do so by picking a side.  He had conducted 
business with Hugh O’Neill prior to the war, and it is entirely plausible that Weston 
supplied O’Neill with the lead roofing that was later transformed into bullets.90  With 
the exception of one accusatory declaration, however, there is no evidence in existing 
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records to suggest that Weston continued to do so after O’Neill had been proclaimed a 
traitor.  Instead, Weston focused his energies on serving the English crown by 
regularly providing the administration with the necessary supplies for military service.  
In addition to his participation in local trade, he contributed to the victualing of crown 
forces by buying and transporting large shipments of grain and other victuals from the 
continent on a regular basis.91  More impressive were Weston’s two entrepreneurial, 
but risky, fishing ventures to Newfoundland in 1596 and 1601 by which he intended 
to feed the army and relieve the hard-pressed inhabitants of Ireland.92  Weston had 
greatly benefited from his special licence to trade with Spain, and this, along with his 
later mortgaging of lands, probably helped finance these ventures and may have given 
him an advantage over his compatriots.93  Nevertheless, he had done all this at 
considerable commercial and personal financial risk, having lost ships at sea, been the 
victim of piracy on a number of occasions and, on at least one occasion, had his cargo 
stolen by English seamen under his employ.94  These hardships aside, Weston’s 
efforts earned him high praise from English officials like Fenton who informed 
Burghley that ‘such offices as this don in her Mats seruice, and with so manifest 
hazard of lyfe, I haue not knowen in anie of this Countrey birth.’95  Weston’s 
assistance was remarkable, but there were other individuals who strove to do the 
same, though their efforts failed to garner the same kind of attention.  Indeed, official 
correspondence indicates that other Old English merchants had put their ships and 
resources at the disposal of the administration.96  Debts for services and loans were 
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likewise owed to merchants like John Firth, and Catholic Aldermen Nicholas Barran 
and James Bellew, yet their succours were not subject to nearly as much acclaim in 
State Paper records.97  
Weston and many of his colleagues assisted the English administration with 
much needed financial support.  Because England failed to meet the fiscal 
responsibilities of its Irish administration and military enterprise, the Irish Council 
was driven to solicit capital from Palesmen, usually Old English merchants and 
aldermen, in order to meet the army’s many unanswered needs.  Irish creditors were 
repeatedly promised repayment out of the next expected treasure shipment, but 
Treasurer Sir Henry Wallop’s certificates make it clear that these contracts were 
rarely fulfilled.98  Undoubtedly, the administration’s failure to honour these debts, as 
well as outstanding supply bills, was a source of great discontentment, and it may 
have spurred some merchants into illegal trade since the Confederates were willing to 
pay ready cash for the same merchandise.99  This, however, did not seem to be the 
case with Weston.  Nicholas Weston’s name figures prominently in Wallop’s lists of 
Irish creditors and his efforts to obtain satisfaction are typical of the situation for 
many Palesmen.  In late 1595 Weston loaned the administration £200 towards the cost 
of victualing English garrisons, followed by another £300 shortly thereafter.100  
Although promised full reimbursement in 1595, even at this early date it is clear that 
Weston doubted the £500 debt would be satisfied.  Looking for a better way to collect 
his money, he travelled to the English court bearing letters from the Irish Council 
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recommending his bills be honoured there.101  It is unclear whether the debt was 
answered in England at that time, but Weston continued to loan money over the 
following war years so it is very possible that his debts were satisfied, either partially 
or in full.  Furthermore, over the course of the war several certificates were issued 
either requesting or stipulating the repayment of certain sums to Weston and, in this 
respect, he seems to have fared better than many of his colleagues.  For instance, in 
July 1597 Wallop reported that the dearth in government supplies had driven him ‘to 
take vpp vpon my Creddytt of Nicholas Weston … 250 barrells of danishe Rye.’102  A 
number of Irish Councillors pleaded with their English counterparts to pay Weston 
£400 for this victualing service and, within a month, the Privy Council responded by 
ordering the repayment of that same sum.103  Nevertheless, Weston constantly 
struggled to acquire repayment within Ireland, for which reason he was driven to 
make regular trips to the English court to sue for the payment of multiple loans and 
debts.  These difficulties aside, Weston was remarkably well rewarded in other ways, 
especially in terms of crown favour and special trading privileges.  This provided him 
with strong incentive to continue performing services for the crown while 
simultaneously deterring him from the illegal trade. 
In addition to assisting the English administration during these war years, 
Weston also exhibited a charitable civic consciousness.  As the conflict dragged on, 
Dublin became more and more inundated with sick and starving crown soldiers, 
burdening the citizens with the cost of their upkeep as well as the threat of contagion.  
In 1598, Weston, along with five colleagues, devised an ambitious scheme to help 
ease the problem by proposing the erection of a hospital for sick and wounded 
soldiers as well as a plan for supplying soldiers’ attire.  While the charges for these 
services would be borne by the citizens of Dublin, Weston and his associates claimed 
that their program would not only reduce the queen’s apparelling expenses, but it 
would also create a local manufacturing industry and thereby stimulate the flagging 
local economy.104  Although it is unclear how much of this proposal was accepted, it 
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does seem the hospital scheme was eventually implemented since Lord Deputy 
Mountjoy awarded Weston, along with Alderman Chamberlain and James Warren, 
£150 ‘for erecting of the hospitals near Dublin’ in 1600.105   
Although the vast majority of Palesmen felt that their services and loyalty were 
under-appreciated by the administration,106 Nicholas Weston’s wartime travails were 
well recognised by crown officials.  In fact, Irish Councillors were eager to extend 
considerable favour towards him, especially in terms of trading leniencies.  In January 
1596 Fenton requested assurances from Burghley that Weston’s ships, which were 
due to pass through ‘Poole, or some other parte in the west of England’, be exempt 
from any ‘generall restrainte of shippinge ... the rather for that they are ymployed for 
prouision for this Realme, a matter which except by himself, is neyther offred nor 
performed by anie marchaunt or other in this Realme.’107  In his examination of the 
Irish Customs administration, Victor Treadwell has shown that the exceptional regard 
for Weston was even more clearly demonstrated in February 1596 when he was 
awarded a crown patent for a four year license to export ‘300 packs of sheepskins, 
300 packs of wool and 50 tons of tallow, from the ports of Dublin and Drogheda, 
paying only what was normally paid as custom by the freemen of Dublin before 1569, 
in effect little or nothing.’108  Export licenses of this sort were commonly used to 
reward services in England,109 but in Ireland, this grant, issued directly from the 
queen rather than any of her representatives, was an exceptional and almost 
unprecedented liberty which could only be considered ‘an act of grace to a very 
special person.’110  Nowhere was the Irish Council’s favour more apparent than in the 
endorsement of Weston’s unsuccessful suit for the fee farm of the Dublin Customs 
later that same year.  It is unclear exactly why his bid for the fee farm was blocked; 
more than likely it was due to a combination of local jealousies and complaints of 
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favouritism, as well as the fact that the other contender, Thomas Molyneux, was a 
member of the New English class which was effectively displacing Old Englishmen 
like Weston from positions of authority.111  Nevertheless, Fenton’s endorsement of 
Weston shows an uncommon appreciation for the assistance provided by a member of 
the Old English community as well as an awareness of the need to reward such men 
in order to encourage their continued collaboration.  As Fenton averred:  
 
he hath so well aunswered the necessyties of the State here, both for money, and other 
helpes in tymes of great need, and hath not stucke at the mocion of the State to ymploy 
his goods and credyt in forreine parts to draw hether comodyties of corne, and vittles, to 
the releef of the Realme, which hath not little pulled downe the prices of the market, and 
given great succour to the people, and the armye, as he hath and doth well deserue 
gratyfycacion in any his reasonable suits112   
 
For a merchant born in Ireland, Nicholas Weston’s experiences were, in many 
ways, unique.  Neither Chamberlain nor Warren received the same kind of praise for 
their part in the hospital and apparelling proposal, nor for their services in anything 
else.  Instead, the Catholic Chamberlain and his agents were interrogated for their 
suspected involvement in illegal trading operations.113  Although Weston’s services to 
the crown were impressive, according to Treasurers Wallop’s and Carey’s numerous 
lists of debts, many other Old Englishmen had provided equally valuable material and 
financial assistance, yet they could not attain such levels of favour or reward.114  It is 
therefore likely that Weston’s religious persuasions helped mark him out as a man 
amenable to the interests of crown government and worthy of advancement.115  As 
Lord Chancellor Adam Loftus asserted:  
 
I haue spent allmost forty yeares of my tyme here, yet, for affection to religion, great 
care in gouerninge and safekeepinge this citie for hir Maiestie, willingness to enterteyne, 
and well vse hir Maiesties Army, as all tymes of theire comminge hither, And wonted 
readynes vpon all occasion of want, to lende lardge somes of money out of his owne 
purss, (notwithstanding his greate losses sustayned by sea) I haue not seene his lyke in 
that place before him, nor (I thinke) shall not of any that cometh after him.116 
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It is impossible to determine the sincerity of Weston’s Protestantism, especially since 
it was a profitable life choice and many who conformed publicly could still harbour 
secret attachments to the old faith.117  Nevertheless, English officials were confident 
that he had fully complied with the State Established Church and, as Colm Lennon 
has argued, Weston’s selection of Protestant marriage partners for his own children 
does suggest that he was strongly in favour of the State religion.118     
 
• • • 
 
Notwithstanding excessive praise heaped on Weston by English officials, he did 
come under some criticism.  Interestingly, this criticism did not originate with crown 
officials; rather, it issued from members of his own community.  Weston was an 
exceptionally enterprising individual, and the special privileges he enjoyed must have 
irritated many of his peers who felt that his advancement ‘ran counter to the spirit of 
guild collectivism and restriction on private undertakings.’119  The 1596 export 
licence, which essentially granted him a trade monopoly in prohibited goods, was a 
source of contention amongst his fellow merchants since it contravened a statute 
established to protect civic liberties.120  His aldermanic colleagues defied the licence 
by ruling that two of them would be responsible for collecting the normal custom 
duties on those goods, and should Weston ‘refuse to pay, the wares [were] to be 
seized.’121  His possible promotion to the Dublin Customership provoked similar 
outcry, and it was contended that if granted the office Weston ‘might convey any 
prohibited wares at pleasure.’122  And, while his participation in the State-reformed 
Church was praised by crown officials, it set Weston apart from the majority of the 
Old English community, including many of his aldermanic colleagues.123  This 
confessional divide, along with the exceptional favour afforded Weston, left him 
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subject to the derision of his confreres who did not enjoy the same degree of approval, 
‘probably because their allegiances were not as unambiguous as Weston’s were.’124  It 
is, therefore, somewhat surprising that when a certain ‘libel’ accusing Weston of 
corrupt practices was brought before the City Council during his mayoral year, his 
colleagues dismissed the charges and ordered the unnamed libeller punished, for he 
was ‘a dishonest and wicked person.’125  In fact, the Dublin Corporation continued to 
employ Weston as an agent at court when pursuing the repayment of debts, and this 
no doubt was due to the favour he held in official circles and the greater success a 
Protestant might have in furthering their suits.126     
The only surviving attack on Weston’s crown loyalty was presented by Robert 
Eastfeild in 1596.127  Amongst a number of treasonous accusations, Eastfeild alleged 
that Hugh O’Neill had lodged in the alderman’s house shortly before his revolt and, 
during this time, Weston had ‘provided all things of importance the Earl needed’, 
including the lead roofing.  More seriously, Eastfeild contended that ‘when the Earl 
was in Dublin, and suspect for his loyalty, [Weston] conveyed him and his train out of 
Dublin at three of the clock in the morning by the means of the keys Weston got of 
the city gate next his house.’128  Weston’s name also appeared briefly in accusations 
brought against Captain William Warren in 1599, though these articles argued that it 
was Warren who had ‘conveyed the Earl away out of the house of one Westall 
[Weston], a merchant in Dublin.’  According to the 1599 report, Warren was the chief 
offender, but it was stated that the conspirators had implored Weston to go to England 
and procure ‘as many culivers and muskets as he could get, with lead and all other 
necessaries’.  The accusers neglected to mention whether Weston complied.129   
Possibly unaware of the great liberties afforded Weston in trading with the 
queen’s continental enemies, Eastfeild complained that Weston had violated the 
embargo on Spanish trade by transporting ten ships laden with corn, sixty tons of 
Newfoundland fish, and, on an annual basis, a ‘great store of tallow and other 
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prohibited wares into Spain.’130  Eastfeild also claimed Weston had imported large 
quantities of gunpowder, but admitted that he was unsure what Weston had done with 
it.  The only traitorous activity to which Eastfeild could assert with any certainty was 
that Weston had ‘fished a place called the Bande and other places in the north of 
Ireland for salmon, which he conveyed to her Majesty’s enemies.’  Finally, Eastfeild 
pointedly concluded that Weston had managed to conduct all these dubious activities 
‘by means of his great credit and countenance that none dare speak against him.’131   
In an effort to further discredit Weston, Eastfeild drew attention to his less 
dependable relations.  Like the rest of his community, Weston had relatives who 
supported the rebellion.  His brother, Richard, was identified as an employee of Hugh 
O’Neill, and might even have been one of O’Neill’s personal secretaries.132  But, 
other than Eastfeild’s assertion that Nicholas Weston had ‘sent wine, aquavitae, corn 
and all other provision necessary for victualing, which ... the alderman’s brother sent 
secretly to the Earl’, there is no other evidence to suggest that Nicholas aided O’Neill 
in any way once the war began.133  And, although Richard operated as one of 
O’Neill’s confidantes, from an early date he had also been providing the English 
administration with valuable intelligence directly from O’Neill’s camp.134  By 1599 
Fenton was able to inform Sir Robert Cecil that ‘I haue ymploied [Richard Weston] 
longe abowt Tyrone for Intelligences, of whose good descoueries I haue … founde 
him to do the best service therin of all others, and withowt chardge to her Maty.’135  
According to Fenton, it was based on Richard’s information that the State had 
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obtained regular reports on O’Neill’s dealings with Spain and Scotland; intercepted 
letters sent into Spain; captured one of O’Neill’s clerical conspirators; had news of the 
arrival of various Spanish ships; received detailed estimates of the rebels’ strength; 
learned the real reasons for O’Neill’s delays during times of negotiation; and had 
acquired knowledge that the Old English merchant John Bath was illegally importing 
arms from Scotland.136  For all this information, Fenton asserted the government was 
indebted to Nicholas Weston because it was he who had enlisted the double-agent 
services of his brother.137  This perhaps helps explain why Fenton was so fond of 
Nicholas Weston.     
It is unclear what relationship Eastfeild had with Weston, or what may have 
motivated him to lodge these accusations.  But, there is no record to indicate that an 
investigation was conducted upon the receipt of these charges, nor is there any other 
evidence in the State Papers to corroborate his allegations that Weston participated in 
illicit trading during this war.  In fact, it seems that complaints against Weston, 
including customs violations, were readily dismissed without further scrutiny.  It was 
probably rightly assumed that local criticisms of Weston stemmed from jealousies of 
his commercial success and his great favour with the administration during a period of 
widespread poverty and disenfranchisement.138  But, administrators also believed that 
such charges were made ‘the rather (as we conceive) because he is a protestant.’139  It 
is therefore presumed that Weston’s Protestantism and his friendship with officials 
like Fenton and Loftus helped guarantee his security.  As Secretary Fenton concluded:  
 
he hath rather drawen envy and malice vpon him, for standinge so resolute for her 
maiesty, in many thinges in this tyme of trobles, then donn him self any good … And yt 
stood her maiesties causes in very good stead, to haue a Maior in this broken tyme, so 
wholly addicted to her seruice, as in respect to further that, he did not regard the murmur 
of his bretheren, who, as they do greatly stomacke him for the same, so he hath well 
deserued to be borne vp and countenaunced by the State here, and specyally fauored by 
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your honours there, the better to enhable him to proceed further in her Maiesties seruice, 
as he hath begonn, and to encourage others to do the lyke, of which sorte, this State hath 
great need, considering the backwardness that is in many, who ought to be more 
forward.140  
 
• • • 
 
It has long been accepted that Ireland’s urban centres remained outwardly loyal 
to the English crown during the Nine Years’ War.141  But, as centres of commerce and 
trade, it is also clear that the towns played a pivotal role in sustaining the protracted 
Irish Catholic campaign against English Protestant authority.  Crown officials blamed 
this treachery on the Old English population’s attachment to the Catholic faith and a 
general dislike of all things English.  These same officials were particularly incensed 
about the illegal trading practices of the urban mercantile community which, they 
contended, were universal and ubiquitous.  Yet, contrary to their condemnations, the 
example of Nicholas Weston demonstrates that there were members of the merchant 
community who wholeheartedly supported the crown.  And, although Weston was the 
individual singled out for special praise, many other Old English names appear 
amongst the administration’s lists of lenders and suppliers.  John Firth, Nicholas 
Barran, James Bellew, Michael Chamberlain, and James Warren are just a few who 
rendered services to the crown, yet none of these men were ever the subject of profuse 
admiration, nor were they the recipients of any special commercial liberties.  Unlike 
Weston though, these men were Catholic, and at least some of them were suspected of 
treasonous activities.142  To some extent, Weston did labour under the disadvantage of 
his Irish birth, and this may have cost him both the Dublin Customership and the 
lucrative supply contracts which fell to competitors born in England.  Nevertheless, it 
does seem that Weston’s Protestantism did much to protect him from administrative 
scorn, and his success as a government informant helped him gain further approval.  
Economic and political exclusion had alienated many within his community, but 
                                                
140 Fenton to R. Cecil, 22 October 1598, TNA: PRO, SP 63/202(3)/122.   
141 A number of contemporaries did believe the towns would remain firm for the crown.  For example, 
Sir George Carew conceded that the majority of Old Englishmen in Ireland, and especially those living 
within the Pale and the towns, would remain loyal even if a Spanish force arrived to wave the Catholic 
banner.  G. Carew to T. Hennadge, 19 February 1590, Cal. Carew, Vol. 3, p. 18.  Also see, Lennon, 
Lords of Dublin; Lennon, ‘The Great Explosion in Dublin’.    
142 Shortly after the Nine Years’ War, Nicholas Barran conformed to the State church. Lennon, Lords 
of Dublin, 229. 
 30 
officials like Fenton and Loftus ensured that Weston was handsomely rewarded with 
lucrative trading privileges.  Undoubtedly, these economic incentives reinforced 
Weston’s commitment to the crown and, in this respect, he was unique.   
As a rule, Weston’s confreres were denied praise, trading privileges, and the 
payment of bills and debts.  This may have induced them to seek out other consumers, 
including those amongst their sovereign’s enemies.  This was not because they were 
all ‘notorious papists, hating the english nation and government’; it had at least as 
much to with the fact that this war had created a booming market.143  Although the 
administration entrusted the most lucrative provisioning contracts to London 
merchants, those in Ireland had the advantage when it came to the local market.  And, 
as it transpired, the Confederates were better customers than the crown because they 
not only paid on delivery, but they typically paid more.  Considering English officials 
like John Allen and the searchers at English ports were also found to be profiting from 
trading with the enemy, it is very unlikely that the behaviour of Old English 
merchants was dictated by patriotic notions like ‘Faith and Fatherland’ or ‘Queen and 
Country’.  Indeed, addressing the Anglo-Spanish trade during the 1580s, Pauline 
Croft argued that English merchants did not see the conflict as ‘a cosmic struggle of 
ideologies,’ but rather an ‘unfortunate interruption to international commerce … 
which necessitated flexible responses in order to survive.’144  The same held true in 
Ireland.  Sir George Carew was right: the ‘traitorly issuing of their commodities’ was 
only ‘partly out of malice to the State for religion’s cause’.  It was ultimately ‘for their 
own lucre.’145  But, perhaps this was the administration’s fault.  Had more of Ireland’s 
mercantile community enjoyed the favour, privileges and economic rewards given to 
Weston, they too may have rejected the temptations of illegal trade and been ‘wholly 
addicted to her [the queen’s] seruice’.146  
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